

Miłoslawa Stepień
University of Warsaw

Truth – a Different Form of Justice? ***Antjie Krog's Country of my Skull***

Resumé

La vérité, est-elle une forme différente de la justice? Antjie Krog *La Douleur des mots**

Un livre d'Antjie Krog *La Douleur des mots* est devenu l'un des plus importants livres qui soit publié en RSA après apartheid parce qu'il tente de pénétrer, en détails et avec exactitude, dans les coulisses des activités de la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation. Bien que *La Douleur des mots* exploite largement de pièces juridiques originaux, il n'est pas une simple relation qui décrit ce qui s'est produit, mais c'est aussi un texte postmoderniste comportant également des éléments de la fiction, une auto-analyse metatextuelle d'un processus d'écrire sur la vérité et une analyse perspicace des fondations philosophiques et sociales de la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation.

Le présent article commence par une présentation de différentes conceptions de vérité et de justice présentes au sein même de la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation pour présenter la complexité de ses fondations et les contradictions intrinsèques de celles-ci. Le livre d'Antjie Krog, mis dans ce contexte, est présenté comme ouvrage reflétant les questionnements et problèmes existant à l'intérieur de la Commission. Par ailleurs, ses expériences narratives variées font adhérer la voix de Krog dans un débat: comment écrire sur la vérité, avant tout sur celle d'un passé aussi trempé de douleur et d'injustice que le passé de la RSA du temps de l'apartheid.

* édition française: Antjie Krog, *La Douleur des mots*, Actes Sud, Arles 2004

It will sometimes be necessary to choose between truth and justice. We should choose truth, he says. Truth does not bring back the dead, but releases them from silence.

Antjie Krog, *Country of my Skull. Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa*, New York, Three Rivers Press: 1998: 32.¹

I have told many lies in this book about the truth.

Antjie Krog, op. cit., 388.

But what about truth – and whose truth?

TRC Report. Vol. 1, ch. 5, para. 29.

Abbreviations used in citing sources:

[Act] – Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995.

[TRC] – Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report.

According to Antjie Krog's *Country of my Skull*, part of José Zalaquett's advice before the instigation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was that it would "sometimes be necessary to choose between truth and justice." [Krog: 32] Truth commissions mark an important stage in recent history, where it was required that differing forms of quasi-legal courts be implemented to deal with specific situations of human rights violations: ones in which retributive justice was exchanged for truth and a necessary political compromise: amnesty. This initial quote introduces us to the questions which I perceive as the driving force behind Antjie Krog's book: questions of whether truth becomes a substitute for justice in the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or whether truth and justice are mutually reconcilable if

¹ This quote appears without quotation marks in the book, but is attributed in the text to José Zalaquett, who served on the Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commission and took part in a conference about the TRC in South Africa before it was established.

justice is redefined and conceptualized differently? To answer these questions, Krog struggles throughout the book to find a way to conceptualize both 'truth' and 'justice.' In her attempt to come to terms with the history of her country, her own people's involvement in the implementation of apartheid, and the ways in which this past was dealt with within the context of the TRC, Krog battles with the limitations of narrative itself, self-consciously asking the question: how do you write about the 'truth', what is 'truth' and is it accessible through narrative. However, the most pressing question in the context of the complex ways in which 'truth' was conceptualized within the TRC itself, is whether this choice of truth over justice was successful: did the 'truths' which came out during the proceedings of the TRC and in the report published after its completion really achieve their goal? On some levels, Antjie Krog's *Country of my Skull* can be considered as an alternative TRC report, one which deals with very similar issues and also tries to come to terms with these various kinds of 'truths'. It was published in 1998, soon after the TRC in South Africa ended and closely follows the proceedings of this Commission, often directly citing real testimonies, while also discussing social, historical, political, and philosophical issues connected to its existence. What makes the book interesting is how it mirrors the same questions that became significant in connection to how the TRC functioned, how it was perceived by South Africans and influenced the construction of a new national identity.

1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Truth vs Justice?

Truth commissions in general tend to be introduced as political compromises within peaceful transitions, thus they function as a practical means with which on the one hand to deal with past human rights abuses, while at the same time, through offering amnesty to perpetrators, they are often the only acceptable form of legal proceedings for members of the previous regime. This has been the basis for many controversies as political necessities are prioritized, according to critics of such commissions, over a sense of justice being served, especially as truth commissions are often established in countries with a history of extreme atrocities committed, such as South Africa's apartheid system, Rwanda's mass genocide, or Chilean political disappearances and oppressive military regime. They

thus stand in stark contrast to post-II World War trials, such as Nurnberg-type trials, which aimed at punishing the perpetrators, yet it is important to note that these proceedings based on concepts of retributive justice took place in a context of the complete military defeat of the previous regime by outside powers and thus political compromises were not necessary to enable transition.²

The transition from the apartheid era to the new South Africa was wrought with a variety of problems that entailed the introduction of very specific institutional and rhetorical tools, meant to aid the process of entering a new form of nationhood. This proved to be very difficult due to the specific way in which the historical changes in South Africa were introduced. Similarly to the Polish round-table talks at the turn of the 90's, where the end of socialism was decided upon by members of both the previous government and the rebelling solidarity members, the ANC and the government of South Africa of that time, under the leadership of Mandela and de Klerk, came to the decision to leave behind apartheid and enter upon a new road.³ The agreement reached led to the 1994 first fully democratic elections in the history of South Africa, in which every person, regardless of skin color, was able to participate in the voting process; the passing of a new constitution in 1996, considered by many to be one of the most progressive in the world; and the installation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission with its hearings and amnesty-granting procedures, which in total lasted from 1996 to 2001. These three events are broadly considered to be the milestones of the transition period in South Africa and as such have become major elements of the ways in which 'the New South Africa' conceptualizes itself.

² For an in-depth analysis of truth commissions around the world and various criticism connected to their implementation see: Priscilla Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenges of Truth Commission*, Routledge: New York 2002.

³ For a detailed account of the historical context of the TRC see: Johnny de Lange "The historical context, legal origins and philosophical foundation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission": 14-21; Margriet de Ruiter, *Imagining the Past*, 21-53.

Even though the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was not the first of its kind, it has certainly become one of the most discussed, due mostly to its scope and magnitude, the complex ways in which it functioned and conceptualized its own aims, its upheld utopian goal of bringing nation-wide reconciliation and the controversies it has sparked among philosophers and theoreticians on the concepts of truth and justice. The South African TRC was largely based upon the proceedings of the Chilean version of such commissions, which had begun its proceedings in 1991. Act No. 34 of 1995, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, established the TRC's main objectives [section 3(1) of the enabling legislation] as the gaining of as complete a knowledge as possible of the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations, which had been carried out in South Africa between 1 March 1960 and 8 October 1990/6 December 1993.⁴ This was to be achieved through the holding of hearings and conducting investigations into specific cases. The TRC would be able to grant amnesty to perpetrators as long as they made a full disclosure of crimes committed during the apartheid era and if these acts were perceived as being carried out in order to fulfill a political objective. Additionally, the TRC was meant to grant victims "[...] an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they were victims" [Act: 3(1) (c)], which would allow for a recommendation of reparations awarded to them. The final objective of the Commission was the compilation of a report, which would provide "[...] as comprehensive an account as possible of the activities and findings of the Commission ... and which contains recommendations of measures to prevent future violations of human rights." [Act: 3(1) (d)] The Act established three committees which were to function independently: The Human Rights Violations

⁴ The initial cut-off date established in the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act was supposed to be in accordance with the one suggested in Chapter 16 of the Interim Constitution (the final clause on National Unity and Reconciliation) – after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, but, due to various political pressures, the TRC later extended the cut-off date to 10 May 1994.

Committee (public hearings with victims and survivors of violations), the Amnesty Committee (amnesty applications) and the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee (formulating policies which were meant to help the victims).

In contrast to other truth commissions, the South African version was the first to be established through a democratic parliamentary act and it also introduced various solutions, which were not used in other such institutions. Among the most important differences are: the majority of hearings were held publicly and with wide media-coverage; broad subpoena, search and seizure powers; a sophisticated witness protection program; its comparatively large staff size and budget, etc. Additionally, the process of amnesty was individualized, unlike blanket amnesty offered in most other commissions, which meant that the TRC had a significantly larger amount of perpetrators giving evidence.⁵ Johnny de Lange in his article on the TRC notes that the South African Commission actually took a third path between two opposing models for approaching violations in transitional situations: the first being the ‘justice model’ – based on concepts of prosecution and punishment, broadly termed as retributive justice; the second: the ‘reconciliation model’ used in various truth commissions, in which blanket amnesty was a typical element that placed it in direct contrast to the first type of model. Through the introduction of an individualized amnesty-granting process and the public character of the hearings, the South African TRC can be claimed to have introduced a form of the “social justice model”, in that the deeds would be punished through being made publicly known and having the perpetrators face their own past crimes [de Lange 15f.].

Inherently, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission dealt with very significant problems on the level of self-definition, as on the one hand it was a type of court meant to establish facts connected to human rights abuses in the past, on the other, it lacked the power to administer justice - in the generally used sense of retributive jus-

⁵ For a detailed description of the specific character of the South African TRC in comparison with various Truth Commissions around the world see: Priscilla Hayner. “Same species, different animal”, 32-41.

tice. Thus, in a typical court, the attempt to find the truth is a means to achieve an aim: evidence is gathered in order to enable a decision about the guilt or innocence of the suspect and to establish the severity and length of the sentence. In the TRC, truth became an aim in and of itself: unknown elements of the past were to be uncovered, victims (and perpetrators) were to be given a forum for telling their stories and on this basis collective memory of the atrocities of apartheid was to be established and national reconciliation achieved. The 'Post-Amble' to the 1993 Interim Constitution, i.e. the final clause on National Unity and Reconciliation, adequately states the purpose of the TRC in the words of Lourens du Plessis: "[...] for the sake of reconciliation we must forgive, but for the sake of reconstruction we dare not forget,"⁶ thus showing the double objective of the TRC.

Due to the specific character of such a court, at least four different types of truth were written into the proceedings, which in many ways found themselves to be in direct conflict with each other. The TRC explicitly distinguishes between four different senses of truth:

1. *factual or forensic truth*;
2. *personal or narrative truth*;
3. *social or dialogue truth*;
4. *healing or restorative truth*.⁷

These various concepts of truth were a direct outcome of the various objectives the TRC was meant to achieve as discussed in the previous paragraphs. Factual or forensic truth is most closely connected to the traditional role of a court of justice as it is mostly interested in the issue of the practical and functional establishment of the facts surrounding a case, defined in the TRC report as the "familiar

⁶ Qtd in A. Boraine et al., *Dealing with the Past*, Cape Town: IDASA 1994, 109.

⁷ Originally in the *TRC Report*, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 'Concepts and Principles', 30-45. Discussed further in: A. du Toit, "Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenström, Gandhi and the TRC", 439-41; A. Sachs, "Different Kinds of Truth: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission", 52-55; D. Posel, "The TRC Report. What Kind of History? What Kind of Truth?", 154-157.

legal or scientific notion of bringing to light factual, corroborated evidence, of obtaining accurate information through reliable (impartial, objective) procedures” (TRC 1.5.32-33) thus it is an attempt at reaching an ‘objective’ and ‘universal’ version of truth based on hard evidence. As discussed by Deborah Posel in her article “The TRC Report. What Kind of History? What Kind of Truth?” the other types of truths were introduced in order to accommodate the acknowledgement in the Commission’s mandate of the possibility of subjective constructions of history [Posel: 154]. Personal or narrative truth in the context of the TRC involved every person having the right of voice to tell his/her own story. In the case of the TRC it was a possibility for both victims and perpetrators to tell their versions of what happened. Thus it was interested in concepts of individual truth, memory (and the inaccessibility of traumatic memory) and the subjective perspective, experience and even myth. Social or dialogue truth is to be perceived as an attempt to reach a new version of national collective memory or history that would be accepted as the standard version of what happened during apartheid: “the truth of experience that is established through interaction, discussion and debate” (TRC 1.5. 39). Thus the TRC report became a way in which the commission hearings were standardized through selection and prioritization into an official version of South African history, while simultaneously taking into account the multiplicity of voices heard. This is also connected to the aim of creating a master narrative for future nation-building. Healing or restorative truth can be connected both on the personal and national level with psychoanalysis and religious ideas of truth bringing about healing of personal traumas and reconciling the nation, most generally symbolized by the motto of the TRC hearings: “The truth shall set you free”⁸. This concept sees truth in absolutist and divine terms, yet at the same time focuses on its practical function as a means to enable the transition from apartheid to a new ‘rainbow’ nation. This element of the TRC was strongly enforced by the Commission’s chairman, archbishop Desmond Tutu.

⁸ This motto was present at all TRC hearings on banners hanging above the Commission.

These various types of 'truth' underlie the contradictory nature of the TRC's aims, which were on the one hand to create an open-ended patchwork of narratives about South Africa's past through the incorporation of a multitude of previously silenced and sometimes juxtaposed voices into the narrative (mirroring a more relative concept of what 'truth' is) and, on the other, to create collective memory, which would function as an official history of apartheid and would become the basis for national reconciliation ('truth' as representation of reality). As Meg Samuelson notes, the end reports of the TRC are an example of how these paradoxical aims were not fully resolved until the very end of the Commission's functioning, where at one point it admits that the story it is portraying "[...] is not and cannot be the whole story" (TRC 1.1.5), while simultaneously wanting "[...] to close the chapter on our past." (TRC 1.1.93.) [Samuelson: 64]. The TRC report itself acknowledges this conflict when asking the unanswerable question: "But what about truth – and whose truth?" (TRC 1.5.29). Consequently, these concepts of truth, as observed by Colin Bundy, use two divergent notions of historical knowledge: one emphasizing the necessary incompleteness and constructive nature of various versions of the past in line with contemporary post-structural thought, the other based on a more traditional view that history can be objectively portrayed and there must necessarily become an official, acknowledged, 'real' and factual version of what happened [Bundy: 13]. Both approaches are, however, extremely suspect in a country within which 50 years of apartheid enforced censorship, extensive propaganda and misinformation, as well as institutionalized denial of the reality of systematic state violence. More relative approaches to history carry the danger of undermining the real violence experienced, as an emphasis on the impossibility of representing the past allows for a return to denial that these events actually took place. Shane Graham in his essay "The Truth Commission and Post-Apartheid Literature in South Africa" points out that Krog, who leans towards a more complex post-structural idea of 'truth', "[...] embraces a conception of truth that threatens to play into the hands of the very right-wing forces who wish to cover up the crimes of the past under a convenient veil of relativism" [Graham: 21]. While, at the same time, the creation of a master narrative of apartheid history is necessarily selective, excluding and marginali-

zing as it prioritizes certain versions of that past. Additionally, such an approach sidelines issues of the complexities of traumatic memory, subjective experience of violence and narrative issues connected to the impossibility of fully rendering such a past. A dry 'objective' account of historical events does not necessarily come closer to describing these events as it excludes the subjective voice of those who experienced the events. If 'truth' was chosen as a different form of justice, was the objective truly achieved if such disparate concepts of 'truth' were incorporated into the very workings of the Commission?

2. Truth in Antjie Krog's *Country of My Skull*

While the TRC report attempted to incorporate all these kinds of truth into the voluminous 2, 700-page text, Antjie Krog's *Country of My Skull* constitutes an attempt to come to terms not only with the issue of truth on the level of what took place within the context of the TRC, but also on the level of narrative itself. The book should be considered exemplary of a postmodern text, where fictional stories, metatextual autoanalysis of the process of writing, and fragments of real testimony, TRC documents and interviews are incorporated into a complex text which seems to ask: what is truth and what is truth's function? The narrator of the story is at the same time the author, Antjie Samuel as a journalist, making the book into something between an autobiographical or journalistic account of the TRC, Antjie Krog as the poetic persona, and a fictional character, allowing for the incorporation of completely fictional elements into the plot, such as the narrator's extramarital affair.⁹ *Country of my Skull* ends with a two-page acknowledgements chapter in which Krog writes: "I have told many lies about the truth" [Krog: 338], which seems to summarize many of the issues the author was dealing with in the process of writing the book. The many metatextual musings on the nature of truth and (im)possibility of narrative renderings of that 'truth' are replicated on the formal level of the text through various experiments with narrative methods of introducing TRC testimonies: with or

⁹ Antjie Samuel is the pseudonym Antjie Krog used when covering the TRC proceedings. This and the fictionality of the love affair are mentioned in the critical review of the book by Claudia Braude "Elusive Truths" published in the South African *Mail and Guardian* in June 1998.

without commentary and background information; verse-like structuring of certain utterances; by giving additional information on translation problems or descriptions of the witness's appearance and behavior; and using interpretative strategies of narration recognizable from literary studies. These all could be categorized within various genres or styles of writing, which complicate issues of subjectivity/objectivity, agency and the possibility of representation of 'reality', especially in the case of traumatic memories. Thus, *Country of my Skull* also becomes a journey into questions of what literature is and how it functions. On another level, Krog also echoes Theodor Adorno's concerns of whether it is still possible to write poetry in the wake of such barbarity as Auschwitz:

No poetry should come forth from this. May my hand fall off if I write this. So I sit around. Naturally and unnaturally without words. Stunned by the knowledge of the price people have paid for their words. If I write this, I exploit and betray. If I don't, I die. [Krog: 66]

Thus, for Krog writing the book is at the same time the exploitation of victim narratives and memories, while being a necessity in order to come to terms with this past. Krog finds herself struggling with questions of how apartheid can be written about and what issues come to play when literature begins to deal with the subject of an institutionalized system of violence and injustice. For Krog, the novel is a journey by which she traverses through the past of her country and her own people's involvement in the creation of the apartheid state and through which she attempts to find her own place within that context. It is about her coming to terms with what happened, which she finds possible only through listening to the voices of those who had been previously silenced and then by giving them space to speak once again in her novel.

Antjie Krog's experiments with various methods of incorporating witness testimonies into the book exemplify her own difficulties with finding a way to write about the 'truth' of apartheid, mirroring the issues with this topic inherent in the TRC itself. Whole fragments of *Country of my Skull* are direct quotations from TRC testimonies, which are incorporated into the general text in various ways. Initially

she begins with placing fragments of testimonies into the text without specifying the name of the witness presenting these narratives [Krog: 39-42]. This anonymity of the victims can suggest an initial attempt at universalizing the experience of violence, thus emphasizing the multitude of voices which are yet to come. However, Shane Graham reads this chapter of the book as making the witnesses into “interchangeable metaphors” [Graham: 25], which indicates that the victims of violence are somehow removed from their own stories, destroying their agency and in some regards denying them the subjective context of these narratives as utterances of personal experience. Further on, Krog usually at least adds the name of the person whose testimony is given in parentheses at the end of the fragment, while sometimes also adding additional background information about the narrator: journalistic-style descriptions of the events before giving the words of the victim (e.g. Mrs Mathlili’s testimony [Krog 48-50]); character and personal background descriptions similar to those found in novels, seemingly by a third-person ‘omniscient’ narrator (e.g. description of Dirk Coetzee [Krog 79-83]); or additional descriptions of the witnesses’ behavior, clothes, demeanor (an interesting example is the way Krog focuses and comments on the clothes and method of speaking of the rape and torture victim, Rita Mazibuko [Krog 240-242]). The use of such disparate narrative strategies mirror debates within literary studies on the functions and methods of literature when attempting to represent ‘reality’ or the ‘truth’ about the world. A journalistic-style account, listing facts, dates, names, necessarily omits the subjective perspective of the persons involved, while sometimes giving ‘interesting’ details to make the story more heart-rending and accessible to readers, listeners or viewers. Krog discusses this when she writes about the methods in which radio sound-bites, due in part to time limitations, are created to focus on a “fantastic testimony”, a “sexy subject” or “nice audible crying” [Krog: 45]. On the other hand, a description of background information pertaining to a certain person is based on choices made by the author of what information is prioritized or selected, thus, while giving a semblance of being ‘objective’, it actually manipulates an external subjective narrative perspective within the limitations of a specific genre of writing, one which we are taught to read in a certain way according to the norms of literature.

Yet, a complete exclusion of such narrative methods and limiting the story only to the specific words spoken is by no means more revealing, especially as testimonies are a type of performance, where the timbre of the voice, gestures, facial mimicry, movements and clothing play an important role in how we perceive and interpret the narrative event.¹⁰

Krog herself quotes Roland Barthes words: "Narrative does not show, does not intimate ... [Its] function is not to represent, it is to constitute spectacle" [Krog 103]. Krog is very much conscious of these issues as she experiments with various ways of writing about what happened at the TRC, showing how in fact disparate versions of the events were given through varying narrative methods, undermining the possibility of representing 'reality'. In a few instances in the book, she introduces various versions of the same event, which emphasize the metatextual and intertextual character of the book. Directly after quoting Barthes, she introduces a number of versions of the Mutase killings: three contradictory testimonial accounts by the three perpetrators of the crime (all attempting to avoid responsibility for the killings), a fictional description from the novel by John Miles *Kroniek uit die doofpot*, and a journalistic account from the *Sowetan* which had been incorporated into Miles's novel. Additionally, Krog builds another level of interpreting these disparate versions of the same story by introducing academic discussions of oral narratives or analyses of the specific ways in which each of the narratives was presented and the psychological motivations behind the various versions of events [Krog: 103-119]. This conscious acknowledgement of the variety of ways in which a single event can be narrated, depending, on the one hand, on the motivations, psychological state of mind, consciously or unconsciously selective memory of events (in the case of the perpetrators' testimonies) and, on the other,

¹⁰ Shoshana Felman in her essay "A Ghost in the House of Justice: Death and the Language of Law" bases her entire discussion of the Eichmann trial on a moment when testimonial narrative actually broke down and the witness, K. Zetnik, fainted, unable to continue. This discussion is interesting in that it shows how narrative can be found also in the absence of narrative *per se*, in moments when language is no longer possible, for example in cases where traumatic memory causes a disruption in the ability to use words.

the narrative context itself (a journalistic account, a fictional description, oral (performative) narration), returns us to the question of 'truth': whose 'truth' do we accept as the 'Truth'? And is it even necessary for the 'Truth' to be established?

This debate about different concepts of truth is echoed in the exchange between the narrator of the book and her husband to whom she admits that she has had an affair. The husband suggests they hold an amnesty hearing during which she could confess and the lover would be called upon to confirm the facts. She answers: "It is useless to talk about the truth. My whole telling of what happened will be driven forward, determined, trimmed, slanted, by my desire not to hurt you, to entice you back, to protect your honor, and to convince you to exonerate me" [Krog: 262]. These words bring us back to the motivations behind the varying versions of the perpetrators' testimonies in the Mutase killings; however, the husband's answer seems to close the debate: "Rubbish. There is always a basic truth: you cheated on me" [Krog: 262]. What Krog seems to be saying is that even though the narratives we hear may vary and may be dependent on additional factors which influence the way they are presented and what information is included or excluded, the underlying aspect of an event having occurred will be confirmed by it having been brought to light. In the last pages of the novel Krog acknowledges the greatest achievement of the TRC as having "[...] made space for all of our voices" [Krog: 364], an objective which Krog mirrors in her own book through the incorporation of so many different testimonies and through the use of an extensive variety of narrative methods.

"What about the truth – and whose truth?" asked the TRC report. If we are to consider the TRC as a type of "social justice model", in accordance with de Lange's analysis, as deeds being punished through their being made publicly known and having the perpetrators face their own past crimes, the example of the Mutase hearings to a large extent seems to fall short of this idea. If we accommodate the post-structural idea that narrative constitutes not representation of reality, not factual/forensic truth about what happened, but a spectacle, a multi-faceted, disparate, variable and often conflicting variety of versions of the events, are the deeds then actually publicly known and have the perpetrators faced their crimes? Krog seems to answer this question in her own way: "If [the TRC's]

interest in truth is linked only to amnesty and compensation, then it will have chosen not truth, but justice. If it sees truth as the widest possible compilation of people's perceptions, stories, myths, and experiences, it will have chosen to restore memory and foster a new humanity, and perhaps that is justice in its deepest sense" [Krog: 21f.]. Whether the TRC has actually managed to administer a type of justice through its objective of "[...] the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of human rights" [Act: Preamble] will remain a debatable question, one which philosophers, historians, sociologists, lawyers, writers, and literary theorists will continue to discuss for years to come, adding to the already extensive amount of conflicting narratives on the subject.

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